[117465] in Cypherpunks

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Re: Subject: Re: Project: Hardening Crypto Against Big Brother's

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sunder)
Fri Sep 3 15:50:04 1999

Message-ID: <37D0239F.72FCBC0@brainlink.com>
Date: Fri, 03 Sep 1999 15:38:07 -0400
From: Sunder <sunder@brainlink.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
CC: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
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Reply-To: Sunder <sunder@brainlink.com>

Peter Gutmann wrote:
> 
> Sunder <sunder@brainlink.com> writes:
> 
> Sure, that's possible, but I think most users will probably notice the
> appearance of the extra T1 labelled "NSA use only" which is used to carry all
> this data out of their office/house/whatever.

Right.  Will most users open up their machine and notice a small little bug
that's retransmitting this to that pizza delivery van nearby? :)

> The point of a black bag job is
> to get in, plant/remove something, and get out again as quickly as possible
> without leaving any traces.  By using a crypto box, you're forcing the bad
> guys to spend hours tearing the place apart looking for whatever it is they
> need to compromise before they can even start trying to compromise it and/or
> requiring the establishment of a secure, undetectable high-bandwidth channel
> to get plaintext data out if they can't compromise the crypto box itself.  

There are only two things they need compromise: your keyboard, and your video
display.  If they can get the keystrokes you type and what's displayed on your
screen, that's more than enough.  They can get at the video with TEMPEST
depending on how noisy the area is and how close they can park.  But if they
install a signal booster and a few repeaters, they don't need to park too
close.

Crypto or no, you still have to type your messages in plaintext and view them
in plaintext. :)  No cypherpunk I know has a brain implant (yet?) :)

If I were them, my target would be these two: keyboard, and video out.  Other
things are nice to attack.  If I were them and knew you were using a removable
crypto device that send traffic back in plaintext, I might wish to stick a
sniffer/transmitter there.

> If an attack of this level is a real concern to an organisation then I suspect
> they need a lot more help than any kind of crypto can ever give them (massive
> physical/personnell security, TEMPEST protection, all the stuff the we'd-have-
> to-kill-you-afterwards crowd specialise in).

Yup.  But every little you do counts.  Remember the scope of this threat
model: black bag jobs that install bugs.  That means physical level attacks
will occur.


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