[117308] in Cypherpunks
Re: ACTION ALERT: Crypto Legislation
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (William H. Geiger III)
Tue Aug 31 10:30:43 1999
Message-Id: <199908311410.KAA18452@domains.invweb.net>
From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii@openpgp.net>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 1999 21:25:55 -0500
To: Alan Davidson <abd@cdt.org>
In-Reply-To: <v04011702b3f0b872d00d@[207.226.3.28]>
Cc: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>, cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Reply-To: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii@openpgp.net>
In <v04011702b3f0b872d00d@[207.226.3.28]>, on 08/30/99
at 08:58 PM, Alan Davidson <abd@cdt.org> said:
>I think it is more important to say a few words about SAFE:
>* SAFE guts US export controls as we know it. Any crypto available on the
>mass market, or publicly available on the net like PGP, would be
>exportable under SAFE. While SAFE does not allow all crypto exports --
>like strong custom-built systems -- it does allow export of the kinds of
>strong crypto (PGP, SSL, etc.) that matter most to folks like human
>rights workers or everyday computer users.
PGP Inc has already shown the way to bypass the export regulations. All
this helps is the big corporate software houses that produce untrustworthy
security products (Microsoft, Netscape, IBM, SUN, ...ect). This is basic
divide and conquer strategy by the government to remove the big money from
the crypto fight. Human rights workers & the everyday computer user will
be *worse* off if this bill is passed.
>* The bill prohibits the government from imposing key recovery. This is
>especially important internationally, where the US continues to pressure
>foreign governments into adopting key recovery. Congressional support for
>SAFE totally undercuts the Administration's arguments abroad.
Key Escrow is dead, even Dorothy Denning knows it never was a workable
solution. The government is giving away nothing here.
>* SAFE is not perfect, but not as bad as some have said. One problem is
>the criminal provision in the bill that would penalize use of crypto with
>the intent to evade law enforcement investigations. This provision is
>actually very narrow, requiring a proven intent to use the crypto to
>knowingly evade an ongoing criminal investigation. The very words of the
>provision were drafted by Don Haines at the ACLU and Marc Rotenberg (or
>David Sobel, I can't remember who was on the phone) at EPIC. I don't
>think the provision should be in the bill. But many lawyers I have spoken
>with believe that anything that could be prosecuted under the act could
>already be prosecuted under existing obstruction of justice statutes.
The criminalization provisions are hideous. In it's current form we have 3
provisions:
(a) ENCRYPTION OF INCRIMINATING COMMUNICA-
TIONS OR INFORMATION UNLAWFUL. Any person who,
in the commission of a felony under a criminal statute of
the United States, knowingly and willfully encrypts in-
criminating communications or information relating to
that felony with the intent to conceal such communications
or information for the purpose of avoiding detection by
law enforcement agencies or prosecution
(1) in the case of a first offense under this
section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 5
years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title,
or both; and
(2) in the case of a second or subsequent of-
fense under this section, shall be imprisoned for not
more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth
in this title, or both.
This section is so loosely worded that anyone brought up on federal
charges that has used encryption would be guilty.
(b) USE OF ENCRYPTION NOT A BASIS FOR PROB-
ABLE CAUSE. The use of encryption by any person shall
not be the sole basis for establishing probable cause with
respect to a criminal offense or a search warrant. .
Again a loosely worded section that allows the use of crypto for probable
cause so long as some additional information can be included regardless
how minor.
SEC. 14. FAILURE TO DECRYPT INFORMATION OBTAINED UNDER COURT ORDER.
Whoever is required by an order of any court to provide to the court
or any other party any information in such person's possession which has
been encrypted and who, having possession of the key or such other
capability to decrypt such information into the readable or comprehensible
format of such information prior to its encryption, fails to provide such
information in accordance with the order in such readable or
comprehensible form--
(1) in the case of a first offense under this section,
shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined under
title 18, United States Code, or both; and
(2) in the case of second or subsequent offense under this
section, shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or
fined under title 18 United States Code, or both.
This one is a really stinks. As far as I can tell it puts the burden of
proof on the defendant to prove that he is incapable to decrypt a message
(something I might add is impossible to do).
>The best defense is a good offense. It is only a matter of time before
>something bad happens in this country and the FBI comes to Capitol Hill
>seeking new surveillance authorities, just like it did after Oklahoma
>City. (Just like it is doing now with the hideous CEPA bill, see "Justice
>Department Proposes Secret Searches of Computers in Homes, Offices" at
>http://www.cdt.org/crypto) SAFE is the rallying point for US political
>support for strong crypto. SAFE has allowed us to get members of Congress
>on the record opposing domestic crypto controls. There are literally
>dozens of Congressmen who will go to the mat for strong crypto now, and
>that is a powerful backstop.
Sounds great but SAFE is not a promoter of strong crypto. It gives us
nothing and gives the government much in the way of criminalization of
encryption. If this bill is allowed to pass in it's current form it will
only be a first in many more draconian bills against encryption.
>SAFE faces a tremendous test on the floor of the House this Fall, pitted
>against the "plaintext access" amendments sure to come out of FBI. If
>SAFE passes it will send a huge signal to the Administration and to the
>world that export controls and domestic key recovery will not stand.
>That's why we've been asking people to support the bill and oppose the
>FBI's amendments.
The only signal that SAFE will send is the they have won, and that the so
called "civil rights" groups are willing to roll over so they can claim
their phrrhic victory. I think everyone would have been much better off if
congress and the CDT would have just let the status quo be. This is no
compromise, it is a complete sell out.
--
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William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net
Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0
Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html
Talk About PGP on IRC EFNet Channel: #pgp Nick: whgiii
Hi Jeff!! :)
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