[117281] in Cypherpunks
Re: ACTION ALERT: Crypto Legislation
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Alan Davidson)
Mon Aug 30 21:10:40 1999
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In-Reply-To: <199908291618.MAA23834@smtp5.mindspring.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 1999 20:58:06 -0400
To: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
From: Alan Davidson <abd@cdt.org>
Cc: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Reply-To: Alan Davidson <abd@cdt.org>
At 12:08 PM -0400 8/29/99, John Young wrote:
>This is serious mud. I like to see what CDT has to say.
>
>Alan Davidson:
>
>Would you or anybody at CDT care to respond to Declan and the
>anonymous person who posted last night CDT's call to action on
>crypto legislation?
>
>John
John,
Thanks so much for your note. I'm afraid I've been travelling a lot this
summer and I unsubscribed from cypherpunks a while back.
I'm not sure what the thread on cpunks is about, but I can say that CDT
supports the SAFE Act (although it's not perfect and we don't like the
criminal provision it includes) and we hope others would as well.
For more details check out my testimony this Spring before the House
Intelligence Committee at
http://www.cdt.org/testimony/davidsontestimony060899.shtml
There's tons more about all this on the CDT web site at:
http://www.cdt.org/crypto
Life is too short for me to spend much time debunking Declan's continued
bogus misrepresentations about CDT. His comments are misleading and, in
the case of Clipper Chip, wildly untrue. None of Declan's comments I think
accurately portray CDT's five years of advocacy for civil liberties online.
While we have not always agreed with everyone all the time, we are proud of
our track record in defense of free expression and privacy on the Internet.
(See e.g., our Policy Post archive at http://www.cdt.org/publications/ ).
I think it is more important to say a few words about SAFE:
* SAFE guts US export controls as we know it. Any crypto available on the
mass market, or publicly available on the net like PGP, would be exportable
under SAFE. While SAFE does not allow all crypto exports -- like strong
custom-built systems -- it does allow export of the kinds of strong crypto
(PGP, SSL, etc.) that matter most to folks like human rights workers or
everyday computer users.
* The bill prohibits the government from imposing key recovery. This is
especially important internationally, where the US continues to pressure
foreign governments into adopting key recovery. Congressional support for
SAFE totally undercuts the Administration's arguments abroad.
* SAFE is not perfect, but not as bad as some have said. One problem is the
criminal provision in the bill that would penalize use of crypto with the
intent to evade law enforcement investigations. This provision is actually
very narrow, requiring a proven intent to use the crypto to knowingly evade
an ongoing criminal investigation. The very words of the provision were
drafted by Don Haines at the ACLU and Marc Rotenberg (or David Sobel, I
can't remember who was on the phone) at EPIC. I don't think the provision
should be in the bill. But many lawyers I have spoken with believe that
anything that could be prosecuted under the act could already be prosecuted
under existing obstruction of justice statutes.
The best defense is a good offense. It is only a matter of time before
something bad happens in this country and the FBI comes to Capitol Hill
seeking new surveillance authorities, just like it did after Oklahoma City.
(Just like it is doing now with the hideous CEPA bill, see "Justice
Department Proposes Secret Searches of Computers in Homes, Offices" at
http://www.cdt.org/crypto) SAFE is the rallying point for US political
support for strong crypto. SAFE has allowed us to get members of Congress
on the record opposing domestic crypto controls. There are literally dozens
of Congressmen who will go to the mat for strong crypto now, and that is a
powerful backstop.
SAFE faces a tremendous test on the floor of the House this Fall, pitted
against the "plaintext access" amendments sure to come out of FBI. If SAFE
passes it will send a huge signal to the Administration and to the world
that export controls and domestic key recovery will not stand. That's why
we've been asking people to support the bill and oppose the FBI's
amendments.
Please cc: me on any replies to the list. I will be on vacation part of
this week, so my apologies in advance for being slow to reply to any other
messages.
Regards,
Alan
Alan Davidson, Staff Counsel 202.637.9800 (v)
Center for Democracy and Technology 202.637.0968 (f)
1634 Eye St. NW, Suite 1100 <abd@cdt.org>
Washington, DC 20006 PGP key via finger
* Value Your Privacy? The FBI Doesn't. Say 'No' to Crypto Key Escrow! *
Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.cdt.org/action
