[117254] in Cypherpunks

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RE: Project: Hardening Crypto Against Big Brother's "BlackBag"

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Duncan Watson)
Mon Aug 30 03:17:13 1999

Message-Id: <4.2.0.58.19990829210709.00963ef0@mail.io.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 1999 21:16:48 +0200
To: Vin McLellan <vin@shore.net>
From: Duncan Watson <climer@io.com>
Cc: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
In-Reply-To: <E11KQoo-00034k-00@nautilus.shore.net>
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Reply-To: Duncan Watson <climer@io.com>

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Vin,

This is Duncan again.  I moved from my work email to my private email.

You ask more questions than I can answer today.
1. Regarding eToken vs. iKey.
  Lets wait until both can be delivered.  Currently both are in late beta 
stages.

2. Regarding RSA signatures that are verified by Wintel HW.
  This is beyond my scope.  I don't know enough to answer the question 
properly.  If I do discover more information on
   this topic then I will try to revisit this.

I am quite interested in the information you mentioned re: Intel.  I will 
do some of my own checking and talk to some of the guys in R&D.  Thanks for 
the pointer.
-Duncan

At 14:33 27.08.99 -0400, Vin McLellan wrote:

>         Duncan Watson <duncan.watson@aladdin.de> wrote:
>
> >see
> >http://www.aks.com/etoken/index.html
>
> >Admittedly I am biased as I work with the dev team of the eToken.  I am
> >familiar with all three development groups, now if we could only these
> >integrated with our chosen suite of tools.
>
>Hi Duncan,
>
>         I'm curious, what do you see as the relative strengths of Aladdin's
>USB eToken over the USB iKey from Rainbow Tech?
>
>         (In the real world, the relative strength of hand-held
>authentication tokens like the SecurID or CryptoCard often comes down to
>something other than the tokens themselves, since the relative security of
>the two two-factor crypto systems is usually seen as a wash.  In the eyes of
>the corporate buyers -- different than the needs of an individual buyer that
>are usually the focus discussion on C'punks -- the purchase decision often
>focuses on  the relative capabilities of each system's directory/rdbs
>infrastructure for large-scale enterprise deployments and other user, token,
>and key management issues.)
>
>         One crucial piece of the puzzle for PC system and data integrity
>seems to be Intel's promise at the RSA Conference that future Intel chips
>would have their own RSA key pair.
>
>         Aladdin, I think, already makes use of -- or will make use of -- the
>new random number generator built into the newest Intel chips.  Is there an
>expectation that your eToken will in the future be integrated with a
>chip-based RSA signature?
>
>         If so, any idea how that will be done -- or might be done --  in
>such a way as to maximize the system-integrity assurance offered?
>
>                 _Vin
>
>         PS. I do a lot of work with SDTI and RSA, but I am not
>(unfortunately) familar with Intel's future deployment plans.

------------------
Duncan Watson
Climer@io.com


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