[732] in bugtraq
Re: NYT Article this morning
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Perry E. Metzger)
Tue Jan 24 15:14:11 1995
To: Rick Busdiecker <rfb@lehman.com>
Cc: Full Disclosure <bugtraq@fc.net>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 24 Jan 1995 13:12:44 EST."
<9501241812.AA11377@cfdevx1.lehman.com>
Reply-To: perry@imsi.com
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 1995 13:18:43 -0500
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@imsi.com>
Rick Busdiecker says:
> Even that is insufficient, actually. If you see a packet going by, you
> can still try to jam the works up and steal the connection anyway. The
> only permanent solution is a cryptographic security protocol for the
> net -- one is actually in the works now in the IETF.
>
> Morris' paper concludes with this sentence:
>
> A workable solution might be to only trust hosts on the same
> physical network, and modify gateways to reject packets that claim
> to, but do not in fact, come from directly connected networks.
>
> Your statement as to the ``only permanent solution'' suggests that you
> disagree with Morris' hypothesis.
Yes.
> Do you believe that it's possible to use the techniques that are being
> discussed to get past a ``two wire'' firewall which ignores internal
> packets originating from the external wire?
Yes.
This won't impact people that don't allow specially authenticated
logins via their firewall, but sites using S/Key and similar methods
for authenticated firewall traversing logins can be hit. The victim
can log in to the firewall from the outside and have his session
stolen -- this is the equivalent of an ATM thief waiting for someone
to enter their PIN at a machine and then knocking them cold.
Perry
