[33633] in bugtraq
Re: Round One: "DLL Proxy" Attack Easily Hijacks SSL from Internet
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (der Mouse)
Wed Feb 11 20:17:33 2004
From: der Mouse <mouse@Rodents.Montreal.QC.CA>
Message-Id: <200402110505.AAA18878@Sparkle.Rodents.Montreal.QC.CA>
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Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2004 23:56:29 -0500 (EST)
To: "John D. Hardin" <jhardin@impsec.org>,
Darren Reed <avalon@caligula.anu.edu.au>, bugtraq@securityfocus.com
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.10.10402101627500.19813-100000@gypsy.impsec.org>
>> Depends. Does it include the tools necessary to sign my own code?
>> If so, what's to stop a malware creator from using those same tools
>> to sign the attack vector?
> How does the malware author get the private half of a public key you
> trust for software installations?
The same way you do, of course. Most likely it pops up a box asking
for it. Given how boneheaded most users seem to be, and given that
signatures will be needed on most software installs, this will be a
common sight to many users, and they will probably cheerfully type in
whatever is necessary to fetch/decrypt it. Look at how effective
phishing attacks are.
No, that wouldn't work against me (or, I would hope, you). But I
wouldn't be running such a thing anyway, and even if I were-- having to
type a passphrase every time I recompiled something would be
intolerable, and if it were automated, malware could automate the
signing just as well as my compiler front-end could.
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