[30336] in bugtraq
Re: b2 cafelog 0.6.1 remote command execution.
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Cheng-Jih Chen)
Tue Jun 3 13:50:16 2003
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2003 10:59:10 -0400 (EDT)
From: Cheng-Jih Chen <cjc@cjc.org>
To: mike little <mike@zed1.com>
In-Reply-To: <3ED6FB98.6070101@zed1.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0306021054590.665-100000@fincher.cjc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
On Fri, 30 May 2003, mike little wrote:
> Secondly, has anyone tried this? The fact is that b2config.php defines
> $b2inc with no test before hand. So that, whilst for the duration of the
> parsing of b2config.php, $b2inc could indeed be set to some value from
> the outside world. It is immediately overwritten with no check with the
> value set by the user (or left from the defalut installation).
> In order to effectively use the setting of b2inc for malicious purposes
> you would have to have enough access to edit b2config.php.
The problem is that the default location for gm-2-b2.php is in
the b2-tools directory. The include("b2config.php") statement may
then miss the primary b2 directory and fail to pick up b2config.php.
If register_globals is on, then the attacker can set the b2inc variable
from the URL.
