[17050] in bugtraq

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Re: OpenBSD Security Advisory

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Tim Yardley)
Wed Oct 4 16:07:12 2000

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Message-ID:  <5.0.0.25.2.20001004124418.02f05d10@students.uiuc.edu>
Date:         Wed, 4 Oct 2000 12:48:31 -0500
Reply-To: Tim Yardley <yardley@UIUC.EDU>
From: Tim Yardley <yardley@UIUC.EDU>
X-To:         K2 <ktwo@KTWO.CA>
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
In-Reply-To:  <39DADCB7.4E416D8B@ktwo.ca>

I would like to add to this in stating that it seems to almost always be
OpernBSD's practice to silently fix bugs.  I also agree that it is not in
the best interest of everyone else out there.

To expound upon the fstat issue, on 2.6 (using the canned exploit) you get
egid=2 (kmem).  2.8 does not give you a shell, but instead results in a
"File name too long" message.

/tmy

At 02:31 AM 10/4/2000, K2 wrote:
>        Here is another exploit for an application (fstat) that
>OpenBSD's
>format string audit has seemingly forgotten about.  What I would like to

<snip>

>Where are these advisories from the OpenBSD TEAM?  Is their pride to
>great to accept these bugs, code fix, announce patch and move on?
>
>I do not believe that silently fixing vulnerabilities is in the best
>interest of anybody.
>
>------------------
>K2  (ktwo@ktwo.ca)
>http://www.ktwo.ca
>
>PS. Thx caddis for some tips ;)/*
>  *  theoBSD fstat - private caddis & K2 release
>  *  TagTeam exploit coding @$_*#%*&(#%(**(@$*($@
>  *
>  *  greets: #!adm, #!teso, #!w00w00
>  *
>  */

<snip>

/tmy

-- Diving into infinity my consciousness expands in inverse
    proportion to my distance from singularity

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| Tim Yardley (yardley@uiuc.edu)
| http://www.students.uiuc.edu/~yardley/
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