[16679] in bugtraq
Re: format string bug in muh
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Kris Kennaway)
Mon Sep 11 01:13:47 2000
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Message-Id: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0009092133590.78418-100000@freefall.freebsd.org>
Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2000 21:39:51 -0700
Reply-To: Kris Kennaway <kris@FREEBSD.ORG>
From: Kris Kennaway <kris@FREEBSD.ORG>
X-To: Maxime Henrion <mux@QUALYS.COM>
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
In-Reply-To: <20000909155313.A541@cybercable.fr>
On Sat, 9 Sep 2000, Maxime Henrion wrote:
> The latest version, 2.05d (and probably other versions...) is
> vulnerable to a format string bug which can be used to make muh crash
> and probably to gain the privileges of the user running muh. Since
> I've not seen this in the bugtraq archive, I post it.
Actually there were a couple of other bad-looking ones I just patched in
FreeBSD:
--- src/muh.c.orig Sun Mar 19 04:08:27 2000
+++ src/muh.c Sat Sep 9 21:32:15 2000
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@
if( strcmp( param2 + 2, "USERINFO\1" ) == 0 )
irc_notice( &c_server, nick, USERINFOREPLY );
if( strncmp( param2 + 2, "PING", 4 ) == 0 ) {
- if( strlen( param2 + 1 ) > 6 ) irc_notice( &c_server, nick, param2 + 1 );
+ if( strlen( param2 + 1 ) > 6 ) irc_notice( &c_server, nick, "%s", param2 + 1 );
}
if( strcmp( param2 + 2, "CLIENTINFO\1" ) == 0 )
irc_notice( &c_server, nick, CLIENTINFOREPLY );
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@
}
else { /* normale message/notice */
if( !is_ignore( hostname, IGNORE_MESSAGE ) && status.allowreply ) {
- if( cfg.awaynotice ) irc_notice( &c_server, nick, cfg.awaynotice );
+ if( cfg.awaynotice ) irc_notice( &c_server, nick, "%s", cfg.awaynotice );
add_ignore( hostname, 120, IGNORE_MESSAGE );
status.allowreply = 0;
timers.reply = 0;
@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@
s = ( char * )malloc( 1024 );
while( fgets( s, 1023, messagelog ) ) {
if( s[ strlen( s ) - 1 ] == '\n' ) s[ strlen( s ) - 1 ] = 0;
- irc_notice( &c_client, status.nickname, s );
+ irc_notice( &c_client, status.nickname, "%s", s );
}
FREESTRING( s );
Kris
