[15432] in bugtraq

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Re: rh 6.2 - gid compromises, etc

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Stan Bubrouski)
Thu Jun 22 20:37:02 2000

Message-ID:  <20000622181607.3394.qmail@securityfocus.com>
Date:         Thu, 22 Jun 2000 18:16:07 -0000
Reply-To: Stan Bubrouski <satan@FASTDIAL.NET>
From: Stan Bubrouski <satan@FASTDIAL.NET>
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
In-Reply-To:  <Pine.LNX.4.21.0006211209500.22969-100000@nimue.tpi.pl>

>- slrnpull (setgid: news) - using eg. NNTPSERVER 
environmental variable,
>  you can cause nice SEGV... egid==news, of course. On 
systems running
>  innd server (and probably other newsservers as well), 
group 'news' can
>  be used to control content of whole spool, and to elevate 
privledges,
>  gaining euid news. From this point, we can simply 
takeover nntp
>  service.
>
>  Under some conditions, inews can be used in the same way, 
but bug
>  is hidden a little bit deeper. I'll leave it as an 
exercise to
>  readers (and maintainers - please audit your code, not 
only fix
>  published bugs),

THIS ISN'T EVEN TRUE!!!

Might want to get your facts strait, non-privilaged users 
cannot execute
slrnpull because of it's default permissions:

root@king devel]# l /usr/bin/slrnpull
-rwxr-s---    1 news     news        50684 Jun 10 18:39 
/usr/bin/slrnpull

so no privilages can be gained what-so-ever in the manner of 
which you
speak.  And this problem (as I noted in my bug report to red 
hat which has
gone unanswered) is in nntplib.c which is part of both slrn 
and slrnpull
so both suffer from the overflow but since unprivilaged 
users cannot gain
elevated privilages from either it's not much to be 
concerned about.

There is an overflow in nntplib.c that is of concern however 
which involves
group names.  In certain areas of the code group names which 
are larger
than NNTP_MAX_GROUP_NAME_LEN and MAX_GROUP_NAME_LEN which 
are both set
to 80 by default could be able to cause buffer overflows 
which could allow
a remote news server to execute arbitrary commands as the 
user of slrnpull.

But again the bug in slrnpull you mention DOES NOT in any 
way allow unprivilaged
users any more privilages.  Did you even bother to look at 
the permission on
the file? Or did you just copy my reports to red hat's 
bugzilla?  The problem
he reported with slrnpull is not a problem and gives no 
access, therefor it
doesn't even belong in the vulnerability DB.


And gkermit, funny how your report seems to mirror my report 
made a couple weeks
ago to red hat's bugzilla as well.  Can't prove that and it 
makes no difference
if you did, but have the heart to give credit where it is 
due, because I can
tell from your report looking it over again you based it on 
mine.  You don't
agree with me?  I couldn't give a flying fuck either way.


-Stan Bubrouski

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