[996] in Kerberos_V5_Development
removing user-user authentication from rcp client
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Clifford Neuman)
Mon Feb 5 22:18:27 1996
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 1996 19:18:07 -0800
From: Clifford Neuman <bcn@ISI.EDU>
To: tytso@MIT.EDU
Cc: don@cam.ov.com, hartmans@MIT.EDU, don@cam.ov.com, krbdev@MIT.EDU,
swick@x.org
In-Reply-To: Theodore Ts'o's message of Mon, 5 Feb 1996 20:45:50 -0500 <9602060145.AA22798@dcl.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 1996 20:45:50 -0500
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Address: 1 Amherst St., Cambridge, MA 02139
Phone: (617) 253-8091
Date: Fri, 02 Feb 1996 20:57:58 -0500
From: "Donald T. Davis" <don@cam.ov.com>
* i'm very surprised to learn that rcp currently demands
a tgt on each end. this is regrettable; i never intended
that any command should use only the 2-tgt protocol.
u2u was supposed to be a fallback, to be used only when
the requested server didn't have a srvtab. so, i agree
that for rcp always to require 2 tgts is broken.
Keep in mind that the rcp u2u implementation was done by a graduate
student working at ISI, under Cliff's direction. There were a number of
things about how u2u was done which I considered to be a Mistake, but
the code was checked into the tree before I looked at it very carefully.
Actually, I don't think the u2u stuff was done by Prasad. He made
some changes to code that was already part of the release, and I think
added forwarding to some stuff. I might be wrong, but I don't recall
discussing the user to user stuff with him.
Cliff
