[17387] in Kerberos_V5_Development
Re: GSSAPI Proxy initiative
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Simo Sorce)
Fri Nov 4 12:25:32 2011
From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAK3OfOgdgPEe85z152Hi06E8GwpZZJ9ch-Vq1GneMCW6nBZ6pw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2011 12:25:25 -0400
Message-ID: <1320423925.7734.732.camel@willson.li.ssimo.org>
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Cc: dhowells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"<linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>" <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>,
"Adamson, Andy" <william.adamson@netapp.com>,
"Myklebust,
Trond" <trond.myklebust@netapp.com>,
krbdev <krbdev@mit.edu>
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On Fri, 2011-11-04 at 11:20 -0500, Nico Williams wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2011 at 10:55 AM, Adamson, Andy
> <William.Adamson@netapp.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 4, 2011, at 11:13 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
> >> Ideally we could store in each RPCSEC_GSS context (not GSS context)
> >> enough state on the client side to recover quickly when the server
> >> reboots.
> >
> > You mean not to use the user Kerberos credential to re-establish the GSS context with the server?
>
> Kerberos has tickets. Other GSS mechanisms don't. The GSS-API
> completely abstracts this, so there's no way to extract a service
> ticket and store it alongside the context (RPCSEC_GSS, in this case)
> where you might need it in the future. Storing all of a GSS-API
> credential (think of a whole ccache) in kernel memory is not an option
> either (ccaches have unbounded size).
>
> Moreover, if we do this in a light-weight enough fashion we might be
> able to handle all of the recovery path in kernel-mode, with no
> dependence on upcalls. But if we didn't by somehow extracting the
> service ticket and storing it in the RPCSEC_GSS context we'd probably
> still need to upcall to make use of it.
>
> >> How would we do this? Suppose the server gives the client a
> >> "ticket", and a key much like the Kerberos ticket session key is
> >> agreed upon or sent by the server -- that could be stored in the
> >> RPCSEC_GSS context and could be used to recover it quickly for
> >> recovery from server reboot. I'm eliding a lot of details here, but I
> >> believe this is fundamentally workable.
> >
> > So re-establish the RPCSEC_GSS session lost at the server on server reboot by storing enough additional info on the client?
>
> Yes. And not just server reboot. The server is free to lose
> RPCSEC_GSS contexts any time it wants to.
>
> Basically, we need a fast re-authentication facility that is easy to
> code entirely in kernel-mode. Thinking of it this way I would not
> reuse any Kerberos tech for this. The server would return a ticket in
> RPCSEC_GSS context establishment, but the ticket would consist of
> {secret key index, encrypted octet string} and the server and client
> would both compute a "session key" (for proving ticket possession)
> with GSS_Pseudo_random() (this way we can make this work even when the
> GSS mech only does MICs and not wrap tokens). To re-authenticate the
> client would send the ticket and an authenticator just like in
> Kerberos, but simpler.
I agree this would be a very nice feature for fast reconnects in NFSv4,
but it looks more and more out of topic.
Time to move this sub-thread to the NFSv4 WG ?
Simo.
--
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
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