[17381] in Kerberos_V5_Development
RE: GSSAPI Proxy initiative
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Simo Sorce)
Thu Nov 3 19:47:12 2011
From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
To: "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
In-Reply-To: <2E1EB2CF9ED1CB4AA966F0EB76EAB4430BFA90EE@SACMVEXC2-PRD.hq.netapp.com>
Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 19:47:04 -0400
Message-ID: <1320364024.7734.705.camel@willson.li.ssimo.org>
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Cc: dhowells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, krbdev <krbdev@mit.edu>
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On Thu, 2011-11-03 at 15:16 -0700, Myklebust, Trond wrote:
[..]
> No, but we still need to be able to do recovery of rpcsec_gss contexts
> once they are broken, and right now we have a major flaw due to the
> fact that recovery depends on a lot of small processes and data that
> is allowed to be swapped out at the moment when we need them the most
> (i.e. in a memory reclaim situation).
>
> If the server reboots while our client is in the middle of writing
> back a file (or several files), then the client needs to recover those
> rpcsec_gss contexts that authenticate the processes which own any
> dirty pages that remain to be written out.
> Key security is an irrelevant concern once your kernel deadlocks in an
> OOM state.
[..]
> > Currently credential caches are stored in files, is there a problem
> > with that model ? Do you need access to credential caches from the
> > kernel when under memory pressure ?
> Yes, there is a major problem with that model, and yes we do
> potentially need access to credential caches when in a recovery
> situation (which is a situation when we are usually under memory
> pressure).
This sounds like a catch 22 situation.
Even if the keys are pinned in kernel memory you still need the GSSAPI
Proxy daemon in order to re-establish the security context, and that
process could have been swapped off too.
I am not sure I see a way out here.
Simo.
--
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
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