[16898] in Kerberos_V5_Development
Re: gnome-keyring Obtaining a TGT without unrestricted access to
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Russ Allbery)
Thu Jun 16 11:24:03 2011
From: Russ Allbery <rra@stanford.edu>
To: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <1308237689.3182.100.camel@willson.li.ssimo.org> (Simo Sorce's
message of "Thu, 16 Jun 2011 11:21:29 -0400")
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2011 08:23:59 -0700
Message-ID: <87lix1yf3k.fsf@windlord.stanford.edu>
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Cc: Guido G?nther <agx@sigxcpu.org>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
gnome-keyring-list@gnome.org, krbdev@mit.edu, stefw@collabora.co.uk
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Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> writes:
> Purpose that is defeated if someone stores the password in clear text,
> in a way that the user can query it, or not in kernel protected memory
> ... like gnome-keyring does ...
Indeed. Which is why in the long run we're looking at other preauth
mechanisms to require things like multifactor authentication, which will
continue to work well with the desired behavior if one uses renewable
tickets, but which will completely break (intentionally) what's otherwise
being discussed here....
--
Russ Allbery (rra@stanford.edu) <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>
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