[16519] in Kerberos_V5_Development

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Re: Comments on the checksum vulnerabilities

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sam Hartman)
Fri Dec 3 13:32:06 2010

From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
To: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2010 13:31:42 -0500
In-Reply-To: <1291398519.20307.237.camel@ray> (Greg Hudson's message of "Fri, 
	03 Dec 2010 12:48:39 -0500")
Message-ID: <tsl8w06pv1t.fsf@carter-zimmerman.suchdamage.org>
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Cc: "krbdev@mit.edu" <krbdev@mit.edu>
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>>>>> "Greg" == Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU> writes:

    Greg> Sam has argued (privately) that it's better to use an
    Greg> MIT-style check because it allows the deployment of new
    Greg> cksumtypes for an enctype.  I am not sure that this is
    Greg> valuable, since we have no checksum type negotiation in the
    Greg> Kerberos protocol, only enctype negotiation.  I would be more
    Greg> comfortable with a Heimdal-style check.


Are there any differences between the Heimdal and MIT style checks for
current checksums?
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