[16398] in Kerberos_V5_Development
Re: random to key from password
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sam Hartman)
Mon Sep 27 17:36:37 2010
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
To: Russ Allbery <rra@stanford.edu>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 17:36:25 -0400
In-Reply-To: <87k4m6swqr.fsf@windlord.stanford.edu> (Russ Allbery's message of
"Mon, 27 Sep 2010 14:27:24 -0700")
Message-ID: <tsl1v8evpgm.fsf@live.suchdamage.org>
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Cc: lha@h5l.org, krbdev@mit.edu,
Nicolas Williams <nicolas.williams@oracle.com>
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Errors-To: krbdev-bounces@mit.edu
Does anyone actually want MIT's behavior of conflating requires_preauth
behavior for servers and clients or should we split those out into
separate flags?
So, even now I'm not convinced that implementing random_to_key in terms
of random_pass would be bad.
I do think it is more complicated than I at first thought, but the
benefits may justify it.
--Sam
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