[16373] in Kerberos_V5_Development
Re: krb5 and PRNGs
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sam Hartman)
Fri Sep 24 10:48:55 2010
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
To: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 10:48:49 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20100921222354.GS7857@oracle.com> (Nicolas Williams's message of
"Tue, 21 Sep 2010 17:23:54 -0500")
Message-ID: <tslsk0z42pa.fsf@live.suchdamage.org>
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>>>>> "Nicolas" == Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com> writes:
Nicolas> There's simply no reason that /dev/urandom on any OS
Nicolas> couldn't be a decent PRNG with a seed taken from
Nicolas> /dev/random (at boot time and/or at shutdown time). In
Nicolas> particular, a /dev/urandom that is not at least a decent
Nicolas> PRNG, however seeded, is a disaster.
I agree with you. However, I've seen no arguments that any of the
common OS PRNGs are in fact PRNgs that don't depend on things like the
random oracle assumption.
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