[1255] in Kerberos_V5_Development

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Re: security flaw in get_in_tkt: address verification

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sam Hartman)
Fri May 31 21:08:44 1996

To: "Barry Jaspan" <bjaspan@MIT.EDU>
Cc: epeisach@MIT.EDU, krbdev@MIT.EDU
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@MIT.EDU>
Date: 31 May 1996 21:08:36 -0400
In-Reply-To: "Barry Jaspan"'s message of Thu, 30 May 1996 13:34:34 -0400

>>>>> ""Barry" == "Barry Jaspan" <bjaspan@MIT.EDU> writes:

    "Barry>    Date: Thu, 30 May 1996 13:22:45 EDT From: Ezra Peisach
    "Barry> <epeisach@MIT.EDU>

    "Barry>    Question: Your code fragment implied that the code was
    "Barry> commented out... I Do you think that was to handle the
    "Barry> multiple homed hosts out there now?

    "Barry> Yes, the code is commented out, and I have no idea why.
    "Barry> Perhaps someone commented it out because the addrs
    "Barry> variable is no available, but in fact the addresses are in
    "Barry> the request structure, which is available.

	Are you sure that there aren't situations involving proxies
through a firewall where the kdc, or agent between the kdc and client
might not reasonably add addresses to the tgt request?  Do we want to
allow such usage?

--Sam

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