[3973] in Kerberos-V5-bugs
[krbdev.mit.edu #1356] CVS Commit
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Tom Yu via RT)
Sat Mar 1 17:15:41 2003
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 2003 17:15:28 -0500 (EST)
Mail-Followup-To: rt@krbdev.mit.edu
Message-Id: <rt-1356-4659.13.6377784767586@krbdev.mit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <rt-1356@krbdev.mit.edu>
From: "Tom Yu via RT" <rt-comment@krbdev.mit.edu>
Mail-Copies-To: never
To: mm@mail.DeuBa.COM
cc: krb5-prs@mit.edu
Reply-To: rt-comment@krbdev.mit.edu
Errors-To: krb5-bugs-bounces@mit.edu
There isn't really a point to validating cred_handle if it was just
acquired by acquire_cred(), so instead of the suggested patch,
validate verifier_cred_handle only if we didn't acquire_cred().
* accept_sec_context.c (krb5_gss_accept_sec_context): Don't
validate verifier_cred_handle if GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is passed in.
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs diff -r1.213 -r1.214 krb5/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/ChangeLog
cvs diff -r1.74 -r1.75
krb5/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
_______________________________________________
krb5-bugs mailing list
krb5-bugs@mit.edu
http://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/krb5-bugs
