[2701] in Kerberos-V5-bugs
krb5-admin/397: kadm5_randkey_principal does not store old key in history
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (bjaspan@MIT.EDU)
Mon Mar 17 12:35:33 1997
Resent-From: gnats@rt-11.MIT.EDU (GNATS Management)
Resent-To: bjaspan@MIT.EDU
Resent-Reply-To: krb5-bugs@MIT.EDU, bjaspan@MIT.EDU
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 17:28:34 GMT
From: bjaspan@MIT.EDU
Reply-To: bjaspan@MIT.EDU
To: krb5-bugs@MIT.EDU
>Number: 397
>Category: krb5-admin
>Synopsis: kadm5_randkey_principal does not store old key in history
>Confidential: no
>Severity: serious
>Priority: medium
>Responsible: bjaspan
>State: open
>Class: sw-bug
>Submitter-Id: unknown
>Arrival-Date: Mon Mar 17 12:29:00 EST 1997
>Last-Modified:
>Originator: Barry Jaspan
>Organization:
mit
>Release: 1.0-development
>Environment:
System: IRIX beeblebrox 5.3 02091401 IP22 mips
>Description:
The current implementation of kadm5_randkey_principal does not store
the current key in the key history before replacing it with a new
random key. This means that a principal can randomize its password
and then re-select that password, getting around the password history.
Actually, I'm not convinced this really matters. Password history
without password minimum life is meaningless. If you have a pw
min_life, then randomizing your key really isn't practical, because
then you do not have a password to type for the duration of min_life.
So, perhaps the code should be fixed, or kadm5/api-funcspec.tex should
be updated not to say that randkey updates pw history. Not sure
which.
>How-To-Repeat:
>Fix:
>Audit-Trail:
>Unformatted:
