[17137] in Kerberos-V5-bugs
[krbdev.mit.edu #9224] git commit
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Hudson via RT)
Mon Aug 31 22:48:39 2026
From: "Greg Hudson via RT" <rt@krbdev.mit.edu>
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<URL: https://krbdev.mit.edu/rt/Ticket/Display.html?id=9224 >
Prevent integer overrun in keytab parsing
In krb5_ktfileint_internal_read_entry(), once we have read the size
and determined the starting point of a keytab record, bounds-check the
size to prevent an integer overflow when we seek to the next record.
(Discovered by OSS-Fuzz.)
(cherry picked from commit c5629fdffee70a296429d580a890e21c6fa17665)
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/8eab516421b6b1fee2482194cd4bedcfc552bfeb
Author: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Commit: 8eab516421b6b1fee2482194cd4bedcfc552bfeb
Branch: krb5-1.22
src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_file.c | 2 ++
src/tests/fuzzing/fuzz_keytab_seed_corpus/big_size | Bin 0 -> 28 bytes
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
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