[16725] in Kerberos-V5-bugs
[krbdev.mit.edu #8994] git commit
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Hudson via RT)
Wed Mar 31 02:13:04 2021
From: "Greg Hudson via RT" <rt-comment@krbdev.mit.edu>
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Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 02:12:55 -0400
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Wed Mar 31 02:12:55 2021: Request 8994 was acted upon.
Transaction: Ticket created by ghudson@mit.edu
Queue: krb5
Subject: git commit
Owner: ghudson@mit.edu
Requestors:
Status: new
Ticket <URL: https://krbdev.mit.edu/rt/Ticket/Display.html?id=8994 >
Fix gss-krb5 handling of high sequence numbers
Commits abcfdaff756631d73f49103f679cafa7bc45f14e and
41ddaaeb286e8bb1bba64fb557ba0e4cff9b404d incorrectly changed the
interpretation of authenticator sequence numbers in the range
2^31..2^32-1, mapping them to sign-extended 64-bit values. The major
Kerberos implementations do not generate sequence numbers this large,
so the changed went unnoticed. Prevent unwanted sign extension by
casting sequence numbers retrieved from auth contexts to uint32_t
before assigning them to uint64_t fields. Reported by Jake Scott.
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/dac8de0b26b9b67c1b03067c1ec90b81114ff370
Author: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Commit: dac8de0b26b9b67c1b03067c1ec90b81114ff370
Branch: master
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c | 4 ++--
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/init_sec_context.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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