[16537] in Kerberos-V5-bugs
[krbdev.mit.edu #8782] [Comment] gss_accept_sec_context()
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Hudson via RT)
Fri May 8 18:36:13 2020
From: "Greg Hudson via RT" <rt-comment@krbdev.mit.edu>
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Date: Fri, 08 May 2020 16:16:53 -0400
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This is a comment. It is not sent to the Requestor(s):
Ticket 8901 removes one of the complications for extending the
accept_sec_context contract to apply to src_name. A second complication is
gss_inquire_context(), which is an alternate way to retrieve src_name from an
acceptor context. If gss_accept_sec_context() returned an unwrapped src_name
and gss_inquire_context() returned a wrapped src_name (it currently always
wraps), that would be an unfortunate inconsistency.
Heimdal has a more comprehensive approach to this issue: a mech can declare via
flags that it uses mechglue creds or mechglue names for all purposes. SPNEGO
does both; as a consequence, gss_set_neg_mechs() has to be implemented at the
mechglue layer rather than the SPNEGO layer. There are some interesting and
arguably beneficial side-effects: (1) a non-SPNEGO cred can be used as a SPNEGO
claimant or acceptor cred handle, and (2) SPNEGO does not have to implement
pass-through credential or name methods. However, the mechglue code to
implement these flags is not trivial, and there is a lot of potential for
memory errors if it is done incorrectly.
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