[5669] in Kerberos

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Re: authentication secure?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Art Houle)
Fri Aug 11 09:21:54 1995

Date: Fri, 11 Aug 1995 09:11:18 -0400 (EDT)
From: Art Houle <houle@acns.fsu.edu>
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Joe Beiter <jwb@wilbur.hhisland.com>, kerberos@MIT.EDU
In-Reply-To: <199508101621.MAA19001@tertius.mit.edu>

On Thu, 10 Aug 1995, Sam Hartman wrote:

stuff deleted....

> * User dials into router over telephone line, uses Kerberos to
> authenticate, typing their password when the router prompts.  The KDC
> exchange between the router and the Kerberos server is encrypted (at
> least, the interesting parts), but the  conversation between the modem
> and phone line is *not* encrypted.  This means that if I tap the phone
                                                           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> line, or something, I get the password.  This is probably somewhat
> secure; it depends on how much you trust your phone lines, and on
> whether it is really phone lines involved instead of some other system
> connected to a protocol translator or something.
> 

'tap the phone line..' 

  That is an interesting point of exposure.  If this was a voice 
transaction that would be simple. Since modems negotiate the modulation 
scheme, it seams that connecting to the pair of wires is the easiest part 
of this. Setting up a listening modem for the correct modulation scheme 
would require some archane knowledge and tools that few hackers have 
access to. As someone who has hardware and software background, I see 
this as the hardest part. Unless I work for a modem manufacturer, or am 
willing to wirewrap my own hardware, this seems beyond the normal modems 
capabilities. 

..comments?

As once mentioned in a  security lecture on kerberos , the easier 
solution is to bribe someone. 


Art Houle     				e-mail:  houle@acns.fsu.edu
Academic Computing & Network Services 	 Voice:  644-2591
Florida State University		   FAX:  644-8722


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