[4192] in Kerberos
Re: Kerberos w/ one-time passwords?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ted Lemon)
Tue Nov 15 12:55:25 1994
To: "Gintaras Richard Gircys (GG148)" <rich@oester.com>
Cc: kerberos@MIT.EDU
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:07:41 PST."
<199411142107.NAA09211@kitty.oester.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 1994 09:34:40 -0800
From: Ted Lemon <mellon@ipd.wellsfargo.com>
Nobody ever said it wasn't okay to send s/key passwords in the clear.
The question was whether or not the password is known to both the user
and the verification program before it is sent in the clear.
Apparently, it's not. The password verification routine doesn't know
the number that you're going to type in - it just has a way to verify
that it's correct. So the s/key password isn't a shared secret, and
you can't use it to safely get a TGT.
Also, the original poster didn't mention it in his original posting,
but he wanted something that would allow a password to be safely sent
from a dumb terminal to a kinit process on the other side of an
untrustworthy connection. My theory wouldn't have solved that problem
even if the s/key was a shared secret.
_MelloN_
--
Ted Lemon Wells Fargo Bank, Information Protection Division
mellon@ipd.wellsfargo.com +1 415 477 5045
