[39627] in Kerberos

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Re: why is aes sha1 the default encryption type

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nico Williams)
Tue Jun 23 18:14:59 2026

Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 17:13:08 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Charles Hedrick <hedrick@rutgers.edu>
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On Tue, Jun 23, 2026 at 08:16:06PM +0000, Charles Hedrick via Kerberos wrote:
> does the encrypt affect the way user passwords are hashed in the KDC.
> (I assume password hashses are stored, not passwords in the clear?)

Kerberos supports multiple "pre-authentication" mechanisms.  The most
commonly used ones are password-based and -here you are about to be sad-
the KDC stores a password-equivalent.

There is a PAKE now for Kerberos, but it's symmetric, so once again the
KDC stores a password-equivalent.

Lastly there is PKINIT, where you use a client certificate to
authenticate the user.  A KDC that supports PKINIT can avoid storing
password equivalents when all the clients support it _and_ you have a
way to provision all users with private keys and certificates.

Nico
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