[38641] in Kerberos

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Re: Decrypt integrity check failed while getting initial ticket

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Benjamin Kaduk)
Mon Dec 9 13:32:02 2019

Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 10:31:19 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: "Stephen Carville (Kerberos List)" <b44261a2@opayq.com>
Message-ID: <20191209183119.GI13890@kduck.mit.edu>
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Answering only the unimportant part for lack of insight on the other one...

On Mon, Dec 09, 2019 at 10:04:17AM -0800, Stephen Carville (Kerberos List) wrote:
> Recently I migrated the kerberos master and one slave to another 
> location using tool called "Zerto".  Perhaps coincidentally, replication 
> broke with the above error message. I checked that DNS A and PTR records 
> for all the servers are correct.  I can get a ticket using kinit (kinit 
> -k host/<hostname>). I finally recreated the keytab file 
> (/etc/krb5.keytab) and propagated it to the other three servers.  Still 
> no replication.
> 
> Any suggestions?
> 
> BTW, while trying to fix it, I noticed that every time I use ktadd to 
> add a key to krb5.keytab the KVNO increments.  Is that normal?

Yes, that is normal.  Otherwise any administrator with "extract keytab"
permissions could ~silently fetch the currently in-use keys for a service
and start decrypting or forging traffic; requiring a kvno increment (and
new random key) makes the operation more noticeable and prevents the
exfiltration of the live, in-use, key material.

-Ben
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