[38429] in Kerberos

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Re: Kerberos n00b question.

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Grant Taylor)
Mon Jan 7 21:57:39 2019

To: kerberos@mit.edu
From: Grant Taylor <gtaylor@tnetconsulting.net>
Message-ID: <d8a6da9e-8375-dffe-7836-aeac5a0185c5@spamtrap.tnetconsulting.net>
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:57:35 -0700
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On 1/7/19 7:31 PM, Russ Allbery wrote:
> If you want to go down this path, I would take a look at PKINIT, which =

> replaces the initial authentication request using a password-derived ke=
y=20
> with X.509 mutual authentication.

I'll definitely be taking a look at PKINIT, SPAKE, HTTPS proxy, and OTP=20
as they relate to Kerberos.

I want to understand what they are, what they do, and how they do it=20
from a high level.  That way I can make a (somewhat) informed decision=20
if I want to integrate them into my sandbox / lab / scratch monkey=20
environment or not.

> You have to figure out a PKI strategy to give the users certificates, b=
ut=20
> that then effectively gives you what you describe: a password-protected=
=20
> random key.

ACK

Thank you for letting me know.  :-)

> I have also implemented half-assed versions of this, such as putting=20
> a service with permissions to mint Kerberos TGTs for users behind SSH=20
> public key authentication, so that users can use an SSH keypair to get =

> a Kerberos TGT.

I'm intrigued.  But I suspect I should stick with the relatively=20
straight and narrow while doing due diligence and learning about=20
Kerberos and how to get rid of my n00b feathers.

> The client/server exchange uses GSS-API, which is fine on its own and=20
> doesn't rely on the SSH encrypted tunnel to be secure.

I'm glad to have that confirmed.

That supports my understanding that the somewhat sensitive (as in I=20
don't want it on the open Internet for anyone to see) client <-> KDC is=20
where I need to play it safer.

> You may or may not want to think about the chain of trust for the serve=
r=20
> (i.e., how do you know that you're scp'ing the keytab to the correct=20
> machine).

I agree with your thought process.  That's way out in front of me for=20
now.  I'm looking at testing Kerberos in my (lab) LAN and pontificating=20
using GSS-API to authenticate things like SSH, and eventually IMAPS &=20
SMTP (w/ STARTTLS), to select few test VPSs.  This is still very much=20
exploratory phase with pet systems.  I don't have a good enough=20
understanding of the Kerberos technology to even think about applying it =

to cattle VPSs yet.  Slow steps.  Understand who, what, when, where,=20
why, and how before running.

> In an ideal world, the machine is launched with some existing credentia=
ls=20
> (like a TLS private key) that are installed on it securely, and then=20
> you use those credentials to bootstrap other credentials it needs,=20
> such as keytabs.

Agreed.  When I get there.

For now, it's pet VPSs that I'm already logging into via ssh keys /=20
certificates and trust (as much as reasonably possible).  I'm 99%=20
confident that when I push a keytab to the server, that it will be the=20
server that I'm expecting.

But duly noted on your concern and idea about priming.

Thank you again for your insight Russ.



--=20
Grant. . . .
unix || die


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