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From: Bill Sommerfeld <wesommer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU> To: jordan@UCBARPA.BERKELEY.EDU Cc: sdsu!vinge@UCSD.EDU, kerberos@ATHENA.MIT.EDU The IP address is sealed into the ticket in an attempt to increase security by a small amount. Someone attempting an attack by replay must be able to forge the `from' address of an IP packet, which is (marginally) harder than just sending packets, and is more likely to be noticed. The hostname is not in there because doing a nameserver/host table lookup will impose a pretty large network delay on the server end; in the current setup, the server side never blocks for I/O (not counting looking up the service key). Also, the domain nameserver is eminently spoofable, since its requests aren't authenticated... With respect to multi-homed clients (clients with more than one net address): this is a problem which hasn't really been resolved, as there is only one address in the packet. If the client binds all its outgoing sockets to its `primary' address, this ceases to be a problem, but this requires special code in each client application using kerberos. I suspect that there will be some sort of protocol rearrangement in the future which should include (a) having a list of addresses sealed in the ticket and (b) tagging each address with some sort of address family code (I'm pretty sure that DEC, IBM, and Apollo are all interested in using kerberos over their own proprietary protocols, and ISO is looming somewhere over the horizon...). The _service_ name is included in the ticket as an extra check to make sure that the ticket was decrypted correctly. - Bill
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