[36475] in Kerberos
Re: Creating enterprise principals with kadmin
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Rick van Rein)
Tue Sep 16 09:34:29 2014
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From: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 15:32:31 +0200
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To: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Cc: "<kerberos@mit.edu>" <kerberos@mit.edu>
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Hi Greg,
> As I understand the enterprise principal name type based on RFC 6806
> section 5, it is intended to convey an email-style alias which should be
> looked up in some kind of name service to figure out the actual
> principal name and realm for a user. Active Directory contains such a
> service; the MIT krb5 KDC does not, unless you use a third-party KDB
> module which provides one.
…or find an elegant concept and patch it into an existing one...
> (Our LDAP KDB module supports aliases within
> a realm, but not aliases which point to other realms.)
Yes, I found the is_principal_in_realm() check that is obviously there to
weed out funny responses due to aliases in the LDAP store, crossing
over the boundaries of realms.
> Creating an actual principal entry for an enterprise name doesn't seem
> like a good idea. A client which makes an AS request for an enterprise
> name should wind up with a ticket for an actual, normal principal name,
> not a ticket for the alias.
That’s why I would combine it with canonicalisation. That way, the login
with an enterprise name is not the normal mode, but it would translate
to a “real” principal name. This is not enforced by the KDC and the user
should choose to canonicalise, but if someone insisted on a funny name
like joe\@example.com@EXAMPLE.COM then I fail to see hard reasons
to stop him...?
Thanks,
-Rick
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