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Re: On credential cache separation between service ticket and TGT

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Simo Sorce)
Wed Mar 5 11:05:29 2014

From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
To: Arpit Srivastava <arpit.orb@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAEvOXU4MDL99atB=ieOw3u+Kvwkg9kKeS7vExV0sqxu9CDUZ7A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2014 11:05:12 -0500
Message-ID: <1394035512.14651.12.camel@willson.li.ssimo.org>
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On Wed, 2014-03-05 at 20:13 +0530, Arpit Srivastava wrote:
> Hi All,
> 
> 1.    Is there any way to selectively expose service ticket and not the
> TGT to the applications (which will be using GSS APIs) ? Can we store both
> of them in different files and not together in single krb5cc ?
> 
> 2.    If I give away the krb5cc ( which also contains TGT) to the
> application, Can application make use (for eg. obtaining service tickets
> for other SPNs for malicious purposes) of its TGT part after calling
> acquire_cred or any other API ?
> 
> My usecase is as follows:
> 
> I have a centralized service for doing kinit and storing krb5cc at an
> informed path. Now, I want applications(which will load Kerberos Library)
> to fetch credentials (here, I don't want to expose whole krb5cc) from this
> service and use those credentials to call gss_init_sec_context() and
> thereon. I want to give away only that content of credential cache (maybe
> by generating service ticket using kvno) to application using which it can
> establish the context etc. Can exposing whole krb5cc to the applications
> prove to be insecure ? What should be the approach here. Pls let me know if
> there is any specific GSS or Kerberos API that can be used here.
> Help would be highly appreciated.

You could look into using GSS-Proxy to handle privilege separation:
https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/

however it requires the exclusive use of GSSAPI calls in the
applications, no direct krb5 calls.

Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York

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