[2940] in Kerberos
Re: About principals' secret keys & attacks
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Wed Dec 22 15:08:03 1993
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 14:49:21 EST
From: tytso@MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
To: stripes@uunet.uu.net
Cc: carlos@athea.ar, sdawson@engin.umich.edu, kerberos@MIT.EDU
In-Reply-To: Josh Osborne's message of Tue, 21 Dec 1993 15:33:59 -0500 (EST),
From: stripes@uunet.uu.net (Josh Osborne)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 15:33:59 -0500 (EST)
It limits the amount of trust you can place in keeping a secret. Anything
that could cause an attacker to gain over $1,000,000 is right out (of corse
a $1M secret is very likely to be comprmised by trusted people also!). Less
valuable secrets are easier to trust for longer, but hardware keeps getting
less costly...
The right answer to fixing this, of course, is to switch to some other
cryptosystem --- like triple-DES, for example. Kerberos V5 has support
for multiple cryptosystems, and I anticipate that we will be adding
support for triple-DES in the near future.
- Ted
