[2451] in Kerberos
Re: Why zero out key variables?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com)
Wed Dec 9 17:36:14 1992
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 92 17:17:47 -0500
From: sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com, Jim-Miller@suite.com
Cc: kerberos@MIT.EDU
In-Reply-To: Jim Miller's message of Wed, 9 Dec 92 15:16:58 -0600,
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 92 15:16:58 -0600
Reply-To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
I've been playing around the source code for Kerberos V4 and I notice
that in many places that program variables that are used to hold
encryption keys are zeroed out immediately after use. Also, some
(but not all) of the buffers that are used to hold tickets are also
zeroed out after use.
Why is this done?
Utter and total paranoia.
Especially considering the fact the tickets are
written to the file system. Is the file system more secure than a
process's memory space?
Yes, if the process core dumps in a publically readable directory and
the files in question aren't world readable.
Jim-Miller@Suite.COM
- Bill
