[24348] in Kerberos

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HTTP mutual auth [Was: Need some tips on kerberizing our ENTIRE

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Fred Dushin)
Thu Jul 28 07:48:16 2005

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From: Fred Dushin <fadushin@fourfold.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2005 07:47:03 -0400
To: Wyllys Ingersoll <wyllys.ingersoll@sun.com>
cc: Russ Allbery <rra@stanford.edu>
cc: kerberos@mit.edu
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Could you elaborate on how this would break the HTTP spec?  I was  
under the (admittedly naive) impression that more or less any  
challenge-response authentication mechanism could be implemented in  
HTTP via the HTTP 401 error code.  So presumably I would think that  
GSS context tokens could be exchanged through this mechanism.  (E.g.,  
client sends a request with an initial context token, server returns  
an HTTP 401 with a continuation token, client resends request with  
context completion token, and perhaps subsequent requests contain  
some context identifier)

This approach may not be standard, but a standard authentication  
mechanism could theoretically be proposed.  I don't see how it breaks  
HTTP, but I'm not an HTTP expert.

Thanks,
Fred

On Jul 11, 2005, at 12:59 PM, Wyllys Ingersoll wrote:

> Mutual authentication is not supported correctly because it is not  
> possible
> to do so without violating the HTTP spec.

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