[2337] in Kerberos

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Re: Local password validation (was: kerberizing xlock)

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Wohletz)
Thu Nov 5 02:08:51 1992

To: Barry Jaspan <bjaspan@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Cc: hendrick@neptune.ctron.com, kerberos@Athena.MIT.EDU
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sun, 01 Nov 92 14:23:15 EST."
Date: Wed, 04 Nov 92 22:44:07 -0800
From: Greg Wohletz <greg@duke.cs.unlv.edu>

>In summary, here is a timeline showing the attack:
>
>1.  login sends tgt request {U,TGS} to KDC
>2.  attacker responds with {U,TGS}_fake
>3.  KDC responds with error, login is no longer listening
>4.  attacker enters correct fake password for {U,TGS}_fake
>
>5.  login sends service ticket {U,V} reques to KDC
>6.  attacker responds with {U,V}_fake using session key from {U,TGS}_fake
>7.  KDC responds with error, login is no longer listening
>8.  login's decryption succeeds
>
>9.  login sends mutual auth request to V
>10. attacker responds to mutual auth request 
>11. V responds with error, login is no longer listening
>12. login is tricked

OK,  now  I  see what  your  getting  at,  and  I  agree  that  it  is
theoretically possible  to accomlish  this.   I think that V  could be
designed  and  located on the  network in such  a way as to  make this
attact extremely difficult, if not impossible, I'll have to think more
on that.  Anyway, In our environment I still feel  OK about using this
scheme to  accomplish  login  authentication as I'm  not  particularly
concerned  if  an imposter gains access to a workstation cpu since all
he would not actually be able to  do anything usefull (nfs, pop,  etc.
all require kerberos authentication), and its annoying to have to have
multiple passwords floating around.  I  don't think anyone will  go to
that  much trouble just to gain access to a workstation with no usable
disk space, far easier to gain  root access  through the rom monitor I
should think...

>KERBEROS IS A NETWORK AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM, NOT A PASSWORD VALIDATION
SYSTEM.  If you use it as the latter, you must exercise extreme
>caution.  In particular, using Kerberos for screensaver/keyboard lock
>programs is a tricky business.

So it would appear.

					--Greg

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