[28475] in CVS-changelog-for-Kerberos-V5
krb5 commit: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Hudson)
Mon Jul 21 13:04:32 2014
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 13:04:22 -0400
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Message-Id: <201407211704.s6LH4M8E006334@drugstore.mit.edu>
To: cvs-krb5@mit.edu
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https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b
commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b
Author: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Tue Jul 15 12:56:01 2014 -0400
Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
ticket: 7970 (new)
subject: NULL dereference in SPNEGO acceptor for continuation tokens [CVE-2014-4344]
target_version: 1.12.2
tags: pullup
src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
index 8f829d8..2aa6810 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ acc_ctx_cont(OM_uint32 *minstat,
ptr = bufstart = buf->value;
#define REMAIN (buf->length - (ptr - bufstart))
- if (REMAIN > INT_MAX)
+ if (REMAIN == 0 || REMAIN > INT_MAX)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/*
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