[8671] in bugtraq
Breaking into houses to steal the security systems... Was:
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Dr. Mudge)
Thu Dec 3 22:23:28 1998
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 1998 21:45:26 -0500
Reply-To: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG>
From: "Dr. Mudge" <mudge@L0PHT.COM>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.19981204073003.0501a5b0@siamrelay.com>
In the SAFER bulletin they mention compromising software that was
explicitly installed as an additional security measure.
While joking around I was mentioning to some colleagues about the
attrocity of some (most) of the security related products out there right
now. Not in what they are claiming to accomplish but in the lack of sound
coding in their own products. I thought it was pretty much understood but
the amazed looks on their faces told me otherwise. So I figured I might
point this out in case that was not an isolated assumption that these
people had. Hopefuly I'm already preaching to the choir on Bugtraq.
[Note - though I explicitly mention ISS and Axent they are by no means any
worse or better than others not mentioned here... in addition I am
referring to older versions of their products. I have not spent time
looking at their most current releases to verify whether things have
improved or gotten worse. Please take this for what it is meant to be - a
general rant about the security vendor world as it stands... not an attack
against particular vendors]
A few real world cases:
A few revs back in ISS' commercial security scanner there were several
vulnerabilities. One particular company contracted me to come in and give
them a report on the level of competance that an auditing company they
had hired were at.
Sure enough, when the auditor scanned the box that we had setup they were
using ISS (version 3? my memory isn't serving me very well right now).
Upon an attempt to connect to tcp/79 (fingerd) we fed them back a bunch of
'garbage' (well, you know... that garbage that is comprised of a long run
of NOPs followed by machine dependent opcodes and operands :). After a few
tries, root on the scanning machine was handed out as there were no checks
done on the data that was being retrieved (or more accurately assumptions
were being made about the length).
...
Axent swore up and down that their ESM systems were communicating via DES
encrypted channels. In reality the communications were simply XOR'd and
they would send the progressive XOR key every X packets. The DES
components were slated for the 'next rev'. Doesn't matter - the point is
that they shouldn't have done the XOR scheme to begin with when the
purpose of the communications between the client and server are "lists" of
vulnerabilities on said machines. Not something you want advertised to
anyone passivle monitoring.
...
I don't know how many "security" packages I've looked at that do
outrageously stupid things like chmod(777), popen(), or system() even!
Even if the program is running non-priveledged and is designed to be on a
system that does not have multiple users it is a demonstration that the
people writing the code to protect your systems (often at outrageous price
tags!) seem incapable of demonstrating sane coding techniques themselves.
How is one supposed to get 'warm fuzzies' that one is having their systems
"protected" when the products doing the protecting show no security
competence.
Vendors listen up!
.mudge
