[7362] in bugtraq
N-Base Vulnerability Advisory Followup
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (TTSG)
Wed Jul 22 18:55:57 1998
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1998 13:25:28 -0400
Reply-To: TTSG <ttsg@TTSG.COM>
From: TTSG <ttsg@TTSG.COM>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
The Telecom Security Group
http://www.ttsg.com/TTSG/
** TTSG VULNERABILITY ADVISORY **
**FOLLOWUP**
Summary:
Date: July 22, 1998
Subject: N-Base vulnerability followup
Contact Address: nbase@ttsg.com
Result: Comprimise security of switch, or render
inoperable
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Introduction :
On July 20,1998 The Telecom issued a "Vulnerability Advisory"
concerning N-Base products (http://www.ttsg.com/TTSG/nbase.advisory.txt).
It was then mailed to the "BUGTRAQ" mailing list.
(http://www.geek-girl.com/bugtraq/1998_3/0184.html).
That same day, Geoff Cummings (geoff@NBASE.COM) posted a reply
(http://www.geek-girl.com/bugtraq/1998_3/0201.html). Parts of that
reply are included in the followup without the authors permission,
however, since it was posted in a public list and has been archived
we believe this is acceptable since we have given him credit.
The author of the original advisory then requested the following
followup be distributed.(http://www.ttsg.com/TTSG/nbase.advisory.followup.txt).
(It is in an email reply format to Geoff Commins' email to the Bugtraq
list)
If there are any future followups, they will be posted on
http://www.ttsg.com/TTSG/ , and emailed to the Bugtraq list sans the
headers and copyright/trademark. This is not to imply they are not still
in effect.
===========================================================================
Geoff Cummins <geoff@NBASE.COM> writes:
> Currently, supported switches with the following ROM updates do have real
> fixes for password/tftp problems.
>
> For MegaSwitch II: Model ROM
> NH2012 2.54
> NH2012R 2.54
> NH2015 2.51
> NH2048 1.33
>
> With these configurations you can do the following to fix these problems.
What about your other switches, such as the NH2016? How about the NH208/
215?
No notice of these problems (nor any notice about the fix) was sent to your
customers (or at least neither I nor 2 other customers I speak to regularly
have heard anything). From correspondence with security contacts at some of
your OEM's, they were not notified either. There doesn't seem to be any infor-
mation on the N Base web site or FTP servers. I don't see how existing cus-
tomers are expected to discover the problem and that a fix is available for
some (but not all) N Base products.
Why was there no response to the two original security reports sent to N
Base?
Why are there still default passwords at all, and why should customers have
to do a:
> set-full-sec enable (this disables the backdoor passwords)
>
> set-sw-file XXX (where XXX is the name you want to call your SNMP
> software update file)
>
> set-par-file XXX (where XXX is the name you want to call your
> parameters file)
>
> del-user user (By default there are two users "super", and "user".
> "super" has supervisor priveldges, "user" is just a
> default. To secure the system, you should delete
> the "user" account.)
in order to "secure their switches"? Shouldn't the default provide a reason-
able level of security?
===========================================================================
The Telcom Security Group
PO Box 69
Newburgh, NY 12551
1.800.596.6882
http://www.ttsg.com/TTSG/
===========================================================================
Copyright July 1998 The Telcom Security Group
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===========================================================================
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