[6621] in bugtraq
[Debian 2.0] /usr/bin/suidexec gives root access
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Thomas Roessler)
Tue Apr 28 11:48:56 1998
Mail-Followup-To: bugtraq@netspace.org
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 1998 15:28:54 +0200
Reply-To: Thomas Roessler <roessler@GUUG.DE>
From: Thomas Roessler <roessler@GUUG.DE>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Executive summary: /usr/bin/suidexec gives every user a
root shell. Remove it.
tlr
----- Forwarded message from Thomas Roessler <roessler@guug.de> -----
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 1998 15:21:17 +0200
From: Thomas Roessler <roessler@guug.de>
Subject: suidmanager: SECURITY BREACH: /usr/bin/suidexec gives root acc=
ess to every user on the system
To: submit@bugs.debian.org
Package: suidmanager
Version: 0.18
[This report also goes to the bugtraq mailing list.]
/usr/bin/suidexec will execute arbitrary commands as root,
as soon as just _one_ suid root shell script can be found
on the system: Just invoke
/usr/bin/suidexec <your program> /path/to/script
- it will happily execute your program with euid =3D 0. This
is completely sufficient for doing arbitrary damage on the
system.
Additionally, suidexec will fail with shells which close
all but the "standard" file descriptorson startup:
/proc/self/fd/<N> (which is the file descriptor suidexec
has opened for the shell script in question) will have
vanished after this. I am actually considering this a
feature, as it avoids some of the $HOME/.cshrc related
standard exploits.
SOLUTION: Just drop suidexec from the distribution. Trying
to do setuid shell scripts is almost always a bad idea. If
you absolutely need such things, use sudo.
-- System Information
Debian Release: 2.0 (frozen)
Kernel Version: Linux sobolev 2.0.33 #16 Sun Apr 19 23:48:02 MEST 1998 =
i586 unknown
Versions of the packages suidmanager depends on:
libc6 Version: 2.0.7pre1-4
----- End forwarded message -----
--
Thomas Roessler =B7 74a353cc0b19 =B7 dg1ktr =B7 http://home.pages.de/~r=
oessler/
2048/CE6AC6C1 =B7 4E 04 F0 BC 72 FF 14 23 44 85 D1 A1 3B B0 73 C1
