[23135] in bugtraq
Re: More problems with RADIUS (protocol and implementations)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Miquel van Smoorenburg)
Tue Nov 13 19:48:33 2001
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2001 16:53:28 +0100
From: Miquel van Smoorenburg <miquels@cistron.nl>
To: 3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
Cc: bugtraq@securityfocus.com, Joshua Hill <josh-radius@untruth.org>
Message-ID: <20011113165328.A11000@cistron.nl>
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In-Reply-To: <8617320960.20011113145014@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>; from 3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU on Tue, Nov 13, 2001 at 02:50:14PM +0300
According to 3APA3A:
> 2. RFC 2865 requires unpredictability of authenticator value in
> Authentication Request packet. Many RADIUS servers and client libraries
> implementations do not follow it. Many of them have code like
> srand(time(0) + getpid()) (or even srand(time(0)) + rand(). As you know,
> the number of rand() states is very limited and it's easy to predict the
> state of PRNG. It opens possibility to spoof NAS Authentication Request.
> For example Cistron RADIUS has this flow in proxy module. Many RADIUS
> client libraries also have this flow.
In the 1.6.5 snapshot of Cistron Radius, soon the be the real 1.6.5,
this has been fixed for Linux by using /dev/urandom to seed the
random generator.
> 3. Most of current freeware RADIUS server implementations (and some of
> commerce ones) are derived from Cistron. And most of them (including
> Cistron itself) have buffer overflow in digest calculation (in case of
> Cistron itself it's static data overflow in calc_acctdigest() function).
Also fixed in the 1.6.5 snapshot. That is the snapshot of tonight ;)
Mike.
--
"Only two things are infinite, the universe and human stupidity,
and I'm not sure about the former" -- Albert Einstein.
