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Re: Mail delivery privileges (was: Solaris /usr/bin/mailx exploit)

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steven M. Bellovin)
Fri May 18 22:31:38 2001

From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>
To: woods@weird.com (Greg A. Woods)
Cc: wietse@porcupine.org (Wietse Venema), bugtraq@securityfocus.com
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Date: Fri, 18 May 2001 21:04:33 -0400
Message-Id: <20010519010434.5D6A27B84@berkshire.research.att.com>

In message <20010518203508.DCF0EC3@proven.weird.com>, Greg A. Woods writes:

>Personally I'm loathe to allow ordinary users to specify delivery to
>programs in the first place, and forcing them at minimum to arrange for
>their mail filters to run unprivileged seems like a very small price to
>pay.  I seem to recall this was the solution taken by the AT&T UPAS
>mailer delivered as the default mailer on native UNIX System V Release 4.
>That's certainly the way it works on Plan 9:
>
>   Filtering
>       If  the file /mail/box/username/pipeto exists and is read-
>       able and executable by everyone, it will be run  for  each
>       incoming  message for the user.  The message will be piped
>       to it rather than appended to his/her mail box.  The  file
>       is run as user `none'.

That's more an artifact of Plan 9 than of upas -- upas on Unix did 
support 'Pipe to'.  But Plan 9 has no notion of setuid nor (as I 
recall) of superuser, so it can't do that.  And while there are 
certainly security issues with delivery to programs (that's why 
sendmail had to implement smrsh), not having write ability to per-user 
files causes problems for programs like 'vacation'.

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb



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