[19275] in bugtraq
Proposed "solution" is ugly workaround,
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Pavel Machek)
Mon Feb 19 18:28:52 2001
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Message-Id: <20010218181343.A174@bug.ucw.cz>
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2001 18:13:43 +0100
Reply-To: Pavel Machek <pavel@UCW.CZ>
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@UCW.CZ>
X-To: Robert Varga <nite@hq.alert.sk>
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
In-Reply-To: <20010212195756.B6592@hq.alert.sk>; from Robert Varga on Mon,
Feb 12, 2001 at 07:57:56PM +0100
Hi!
> > 1) {
> > 2) static time_t last_kill_time = 0;
> > 3) if (time(NULL) - last_kill_time > 60 && getppid() != 1)
> > 4) {
> > 5) last_kill_time = time(NULL);
> > 6) kill(SIGALRM, getppid());
> > 7) }
> > 8) fatal("Bad result from rsa_private_decrypt");
> > 9) }
This looks more like ugly workaround than proper fix to me. If
attacker can do 400*60 requests per second, he can still decrypt
private key.
Solution would be to reconfig after number of _attempts_, not
time. Plus, it is still racy, as it uses kill().
What about attacker doing 400*3600 requests before kill actually
reaches the parent?
Pavel
--
I'm pavel@ucw.cz. "In my country we have almost anarchy and I don't care."
Panos Katsaloulis describing me w.r.t. patents at discuss@linmodems.org
