[13775] in bugtraq
Re: Tempfile vulnerabilities
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Marc Lehmann)
Wed Feb 9 10:30:05 2000
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Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 00:27:43 +0100
Reply-To: Marc Lehmann <marc@GIMP.ORG>
From: Marc Lehmann <marc@GIMP.ORG>
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In-Reply-To: <20000205121609.A149@nagash.suidshell.net>; from
antirez@invece.org on Sat, Feb 05, 2000 at 12:16:09PM +0100
> > /dev/random -- a world readable device -- should do the following:
> >
> > cat /dev/random > /dev/null &
> >
> > Crypto software which uses those devices should be doing some kind of
> > checking to make sure that they are getting at least good entropy. I
On linux at least, the above is at most a denial of service attack, as
/dev/random does not deliver any data when it runs out of entropy (and
programs usually are prepared to wait for data on that devices for some
time).
On linux/x86, moving my mouse generates >400bytes/s random data (this is
currently specific to x86), and if two processes listen on /dev/random,
both get about half the random data, so it seems that there isn't even a
denial of service attack here.
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