[11006] in bugtraq

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Re: PGP 6.5.1 has been released

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Mark Wooding)
Tue Jul 13 14:13:01 1999

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Message-Id:  <14219.869.178793.725790@catbert.ebi.ac.uk>
Date:         Tue, 13 Jul 1999 10:14:13 +0100
Reply-To: Mark Wooding <mdw@EBI.AC.UK>
From: Mark Wooding <mdw@EBI.AC.UK>
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To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
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___Viper___ _ <viper_____@HOTMAIL.COM> wrote:

> "Having the option" never hurt anyone.  You can produce SDAs, and use
> them if you wish, AND you can NOT open executables that arrived in
> your mailbox and you don't trust.

In this particular case, it's even sillier than usual.

There's now an active attack against symmetric passphrases.  I can
fiddle with an SDA in transit so that it does its job normally and also
emails me the passphrase that successfully decrypted the archive.

So basically it's `protected by PGP's strong cryptography' which is
entirely wasted by a brain-damaged idea that some marketroid probably
thought would look kewl with a tick in the box next to it.

And that's without Steven Bellovin's completely legitimate concerns
about `executable content' in general: rich computing experiences and
all that.

Duh.

> It's madness to say that it is a "security threat".  With your logic,
> e-mailing is a security threat as well ;-) Who knows what you can send
> over e-mail !

Quite so.  I make sure that my mail reader won't do anything with a
message other than display it in a text window until I've had a chance
to examine it and decide what should happen next.

Executable email messages are one of the worst ideas I've ever heard
of.  And that's saying something.

[Thanks to Clive Jones, who came up with the attack above.]

-- [mdw]

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