[10501] in bugtraq
Re: Infosec.19990305.macof.a
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Alan Cox)
Sun May 9 09:12:18 1999
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Message-Id: <19990509145335.A20670@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Date: Sun, 9 May 1999 14:53:35 +0100
Reply-To: Alan Cox <alan@LXORGUK.UKUU.ORG.UK>
From: Alan Cox <alan@LXORGUK.UKUU.ORG.UK>
X-To: "Greg A. Woods" <woods@weird.com>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
In-Reply-To: <m10gKXR-000g5eC@most.weird.com>; from Greg A. Woods on Sat,
May 08, 1999 at 11:46:01PM -0400
> Well, um, actually it is supposedly possible to pre-program some
> switches with the MACs of the host(s) it should see on a given segment.
Yes, which makes little odds
> Assuming you've done this, and that it's possible to stop the switch
> from learning new MACs (I've not yet tried this myself), it should make
Which isnt needed
> many of the attacks described to date much more difficult, if not
> impossible.
It stops some of the basic spanning tree attacks
> In addition the switch *is* an extra level of defense, even if it's not
> 100% guaranteed, as it does prevent trivial sniffing (as anyone who grew
> up diagnosing Ethernet problems with packet sniffers can tell you!).
It works the other way. The switch stops the administrator seeing the
games I'm playing across other ports. Crackers hide behind switches. They
unicast the attack arps, they redirect the traffic and admins on another
segment don't even see a change..
--
With trembling hands he unfurled the ancient cracked parchment, this was
the place, it had to be. Uncertainly he began to mumble the chant "rdbms,
sql , third normal formal form, java, table, scalable". Something moved..
From outside they heard a scream and a thud. The sales department had awoken
