[279] in Privacy_Forum
[ PRIVACY Forum ] Practical Issues of the Proposed "Global Internet
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (privacy@vortex.com)
Mon Oct 1 18:44:26 2007
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Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2007 15:10:40 -0700
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Practical Issues of the Proposed
"Global Internet Measurement Analysis Array"
http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/000303.html
Greetings. In "Proposal for Breaking the Internet Network
Neutrality Deadlock" ( http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/000299.html ),
I recently suggested a project for the gathering and analysis of
worldwide Internet traffic data and characteristics, for Network
Neutrality-related and other purposes, based on a distributed
architecture of processes running mainly on end-user computers.
I've now dubbed this project the "Global Internet Measurement
Analysis Array" (GIMAA).
I'd like to now touch very briefly on a few of the many practical
considerations that such a project would entail, including
deployment, security, and privacy issues.
To be useful, the measurement collection environment requires a very
large number of participating end-user sites. While standalone
versions of the GIMAA programs will of course be needed for a
variety of hardware platforms, deployment could be significantly
hastened by including the associated code into other already widely
used end-user packages, e.g. popular browser/OS toolbars and/or free
utility application bundles. It may even prove possible to
primarily use the existing application/toolbar data traffic as the
foundational operational corpus for the measurement system itself,
supplanted as necessary by purpose-generated measurement-related
data.
To the extent that the vendors of such toolbar and application
packages are interested in the potential ongoing output of a GIMAA
environment, such "packaging" would seem an attractive possible
route for dissemination of the system, with the goal of reaching a
practical deployment level as quickly as possible.
A range of security and privacy issues accompany a project like
GIMAA, some of which will likely be leveraged by some entities into
objections against the entire project.
Clearly the GIMAA code modules, measurement payload data, and any
associated aggregated data will need to be secure and as protected
against manipulation and tampering as current technology will allow.
User data on participating systems must be protected as a first
priority concern.
A more unique issue with the GIMAA methodology is that the
techniques envisioned, if they prove out and are very widely
deployed, could be extremely powerful. As such, concerns are sure
to be raised that GIMAA may publicly reveal network traffic,
topological, vulnerability, and other data that some network
participants, and others, might prefer to keep hidden for business,
security, or other reasons.
It can be anticipated, for example, that some firms (including ISPs)
would become concerned that GIMAA node activity could reveal what
they consider to be proprietary aspects of their network topologies,
and that attempts to block GIMAA measurement traffic, and/or the
writing of prohibitions against such measurement techniques into
Terms of Service agreements, would be forthcoming.
Of course, one of the key purposes proposed for GIMAA is to detect
vulnerabilities and abuses so that they can be corrected (through
technical or policy means, as appropriate), and it would be expected
that some of those entities responsible for such conditions would
not be enthusiastic about their being so exposed.
I also consider it likely that GIMAA will be criticized from some
quarters on national security grounds, with the argument being that
the Internet infrastructural data that could be exposed would make
attacks on the Internet and its attached systems more effective.
All of these concerns are real, and considerable effort will be
needed to balance the benefits and risks associated with a project
like GIMAA.
But aside from the more obvious cost/benefit analysis that can be
applied to this project, there's another basic reality that renders
some of these concerns relatively moot in important respects.
The categories of measurement methodologies proposed for GIMAA could
be deployed on a clandestine basis by technologically skilled
adversaries, perhaps as part of widely disseminated computer viruses
and the like. If GIMAA does not move forward, that doesn't
guarantee that "bad guys" won't get access to such data via their
own GIMAA-like technologies that could infect systems around the
world. Blocking GIMAA would only assure that honest players wouldn't
have access to the same sorts of important information.
In my book, it's nonsensical and dangerous to block open and honest
use of even potentially sensitive data, while the unscrupulous can
likely gain access to similar data via their own means and for their
own purposes. Sometimes sunlight really is the best disinfectant,
and in the case of the Internet the old paradigm of "security
through obscurity" has been widely discredited.
GIMAA, while not without real risks, will hopefully shed some needed
light on aspects of the operational Internet that have been in the
shadows for far too long, having caused a resulting lack of trust
that only more open availability of data in these respects can likely
ameliorate.
Thanks as always for your consideration.
--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein
lauren@vortex.com or lauren@pfir.org
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
http://www.pfir.org/lauren
Co-Founder, PFIR
- People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org
Founder, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com
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