[99987] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: How to Handle ISPs Who Turn a Blind Eye to Criminal Activity?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Paul Ferguson)
Fri Oct 12 04:08:02 2007
From: "Paul Ferguson" <fergdawg@netzero.net>
Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2007 08:00:46 GMT
To: nanog@nanog.org
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu
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Not intentionally trying to be retarded, but I've received
an enormous number of private responses.
Many thanks.
It is odd, however, why folks felt the need to reply privately,
and although I'm glad you did reply, it is somewhat of a statement,
in and of itself, on the issues involved that things happen the way
they do. Maybe.
In any event, I did want to mention that some people involved in the
aforementioned "activities" may be getting their feelings hurt real
soon now due to "looking the other way" and pretending they didn't
know what was going on.
Or maybe not.
It should be pretty fun to to see what happens.
Thanks for everyone who responded.
Cheers!
- - ferg
- -- "Paul Ferguson" <fergdawg@netzero.net> wrote:
This question is part reality, part surreality.
Let me ask you this: What would you do when you have alerted
(via abuse@ contacts) a notable ISP in the U.S. (not a tier one,
and not just one of them) about KNOWN, VERIFIABLE, and RECURRING
criminal activity in their customer downstreams? =
And the downstream(s) do not respond? And the criminal activity
continues?
The most obvious answer is: Gather evidence, contact law
enforcement.
Right?
I just wanted to reach out the NANOG on this and see what you
thought... How would you handle it?
- - ferg
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--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
Engineering Architecture for the Internet
fergdawg(at)netzero.net
ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/
