[97814] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Yahoo outage summary
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Douglas Otis)
Mon Jul 9 13:18:39 2007
In-Reply-To: <469262C5.6080506@psg.com>
Cc: Tony Tauber <ttauber@1-4-5.net>,
Roland Dobbins <rdobbins@cisco.com>, Nanog <nanog@nanog.org>
From: Douglas Otis <dotis@mail-abuse.org>
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2007 10:18:00 -0700
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu
On Jul 9, 2007, at 9:31 AM, Randy Bush wrote:
> Tony Tauber wrote:
>> There's no magic bullet in updating BGP if a fundamental,
>> verifiable data model is not accepted and agreed upon.
>
> the space of routing data validation is large, we can explore it at
> our leisure, and we have been for some years. but my point was
> that it is silly to indulge in conjecturbation on the cause of the
> recent event and excoriate l(3), hanaro, or john curran's
> grandmother until we have heard from the folk who have actual data.
I can't help but conjecturbate how this might relate to route flap
damping, and whether overly aggressive RFD might related to such
DoS. The other side of the coin would be that RFD might also limit
the extent spoofed routes. The amount of noise within the system
makes it difficult for administrators to fully comprehending what
happened while it is happening. A means to even partially validate
routing information might provide more timely and greater insight.
This insight may help rule out nefarious causes. When it doesn't,
the issue might be far more serious. Crying wolf too many times is
bad, but not seeing the wolf could be worse.
-Doug
