[93052] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: register.com down sev0?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Fergie)
Thu Oct 26 01:17:24 2006

From: "Fergie" <fergdawg@netzero.net>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2006 05:11:14 GMT
To: patrick@ianai.net
Cc: nanog@merit.edu, patrick@ianai.net
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu


I don't want to detract from the heat of this discussion, as
important as it is, but it (the discussion) illustrates a point
that RIPE has recognized -- and is actively perusing -- yet, ISPs
on this continent seem consistently to ignore: The consistent
implementation of BCP 38.

It is nothing less than irresponsible, IMO...

Why _is_ that?

- ferg



-- "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick@ianai.net> wrote:

[snip]

There is no single "appropriately[sic] place" which can absorb  =

50Mpps.  If you meant "appropriately placed" (as in topologically  =

dispersed locations), a well crafted attack could still guarantee _at  =

least_ a partial DoS from an end user PoV.

It is essentially impossible to distinguish end-user requests from  =

(im)properly created DoS packets (especially until BCP38 is widely  =

adopted - i.e. probably never).  Since there is no single place - no  =

13 places - which can withstand a well crafted DoS, you are  =

guaranteed that some users will not be able to reach any of your  =

listed authorities.

This is not speculation, this is fact.  All a good provider can do,  =

even with 1000s of server, is minimize the impact of any DoS.

[snip]


--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 Engineering Architecture for the Internet
 fergdawg(at)netzero.net
 ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/


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